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Mining Sensor Data in Cyber-Physical Systems
Lu-An Tang , Jiawei Han, and Guofei Jiang
Abstract: A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) integrates physical devices (i.e., sensors) with cyber (i.e., informational)
components to form a context sensitive system that responds intelligently to dynamic changes in real-world
situations. Such a system has wide applications in the scenarios of traffic control, battlefield surveillance,
environmental monitoring, and so on. A core element of CPS is the collection and assessment of information from
noisy, dynamic, and uncertain physical environments integrated with many types of cyber-space resources. The
potential of this integration is unbounded. To achieve this potential the raw data acquired from the physical world
must be transformed into useable knowledge in real-time. Therefore, CPS brings a new dimension to knowledge
discovery because of the emerging synergism of the physical and the cyber. The various properties of the physical
world must be addressed in information management and knowledge discovery. This paper discusses the problems
of mining sensor data in CPS: With a large number of wireless sensors deployed in a designated area, the task
is real time detection of intruders that enter the area based on noisy sensor data. The framework of IntruMine
is introduced to discover intruders from untrustworthy sensor data. IntruMine first analyzes the trustworthiness
of sensor data, then detects the intruders’ locations, and verifies the detections based on a graph model of the
relationships between sensors and intruders.
Key words: cyber-physical system; sensor network; data trustworthiness

1

Introduction

A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is an integration
of sensor network with cyber resources. The CPS
collects sensor data from physical world and links
them to various information sources for realtime analysis. Such a system has many promising
applications in both military and civilian fields,
including missile defense[1] , battlefield awareness[2, 3] ,
traffic control[4, 5] , neighborhood watch[6] , environment
monitoring[7] , and wildlife tracking[8] . The research
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topics of CPS have been placed on the top of the
priority list for federal research investment in the fiscal
year report of U.S. President’s council of advisors on
science and technology.
The key task in such a scenario is to mine the real
intruder information from a large set of untrustworthy
sensor data. Such a problem is considered one of the
major challenges in CPS research field, partly due to
the following problems:
 Untrustworthy data: The collected data are highly
unreliable due to hardware and communication
limits. Many deployment experiences have shown
that untrustworthy data is the most serious problem
that impacts CPS performance. Tolle et al. pointed
out that faulty data can occur in various unexpected
ways and less than 69% of their data could be
used for meaningful interpretation[7] . Szewczyk et
al. also found that about 30% of data are faulty
in their deployment[9] . It is difficult to filter out
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untrustworthy data records solely based on the
data values, since most faulty records have values
similar to real ones.
 Complex requirements: Many intruder detection
algorithms rely on prior knowledge of the
number of intruders, movement speed, and so
on[10-13] . However, the users often cannot provide
such attributes of intruders in real applications. In
contrast, they would like to obtain fine-grained
situational awareness of the battlefield and
require the system to generate this information
automatically.
 Unsupervised learning: Several intrusion detection
methods build up the models or classifiers based
on a training dataset[14, 15] . However, such training
datasets are hard to get in realistic deployments. It
is costly and error-prone to manually label a
large sensor dataset. In addition, the data are
based on a specific deployment plan, hence it is
usually difficult to apply a training set from one
deployment to another. To increase the system
feasibility, the intruder mining algorithm should
use unsupervised learning that does not require a
large training dataset.
 Big data: A typical CPS includes hundreds, even
thousands of sensors. Each sensor generates a
reading every few minutes, and the readings form a
huge data stream. Furthermore, many applications
require immediate action against intruders. The
mining must be efficient to process the huge data
stream and find intruders in real time.
In this paper, we introduce the framework of
IntruMine to find real intruders from untrustworthy
data. IntruMine iteratively models the relationship
between sensors and intruders via monitoring graph,
and estimates the attribute values of the intruders
based on the link information of such a graph. The
confidence of intruder detection is computed based on
the difference between the real sensor readings and
the estimated ones. This measurement is used to verify
the detected intruders and filter out false positives. A
preliminary version of this paper has been published in
Refs. [16, 17].

2

Related Works

The research problems of CPS are relatively
new. However, many related topics, such as detecting
faulty sensor signals or target tracking, have been
studied extensively in the past decades. The community
of data management and data mining also proposes
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some methods to find outliers or anomalies for sensor
network applications. According to the methodology,
the related works can be roughly classified into three
categories: statistical model-based approaches, spatialand-temporal similarity-based methods, and feature
retrieving techniques.
2.1

Statistical model-based approaches

A large category of statistical models have been
proposed to detect faulty sensor data. The faulty
data are defined as the ones that do not follow the
distribution of those models. Deshpande et al. used
models of time-varying multivariate Gaussians to
respond to predetermined queries[18] . The tool responds
to a predetermined set of query types, treating the
sensor network like a database. Elnahrawy and Nath
utilized a Bayesian Classifier (BC) to clean the
data[19] . They modeled the sensor data as a standard
normal distribution, and generated the prior knowledge
of noise model from training data. Koushanfar et
al. developed a cross validation method for Online
False Alarm Detection (OFAD) based on multiple fault
models[20] .
To some extent, those methods can help users filter
false sensor data. However, most of them need training
datasets or prior knowledge to construct the models and
tune the parameters. Such information is not available in
many real scenarios. Moreover, with so many statistical
models, it is hard for the user to determine which one
is the most appropriate. As mentioned in Ref. [18],
the existing models are still not good enough, and the
statistical models cannot be fit for many complex cases
in real applications.
2.2

Spatial-and-temporal similarity-based
methods

The spatial-and-temporal similarity-based methods
are based on the assumption that there are strong
correlations between the sensor data and their
neighbors (spatial similarity), as well as their histories
(temporal similarity). Krishnamachari and Iyengar
exploited spatial and temporal relations of faulty
sensor data[21] . Jeffery et al. attempted to take
advantage of both spatial and temporal relations to
correct faulty records[22] . Their methods assume that
all data within each spatial and temporal granule
are homogeneous. The fault recognition programs
treat any value exceeding a high value threshold
as faulty. Subramaniam et al. proposed the NonParametric Outlier Detection (NPOD) model for sensor
data[23] . This framework detects the outliers in a
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distributed manner by checking each sensor’s k
nearest neighbors. The data distributions are estimated
by a kernel density function and multi-dimensional
outliers are discovered by monitoring heterogeneous
readings. Xiao et al. provided a sensor rank based
outlier detection method[24] . The system generates
clusters of sensor readings and detects the outliers
by measuring a sensor reading’s dissimilarity to its
neighbors.
There are several limits of those techniques: (1) The
spatial similarity hypothesis may not be valid in all
the cases, the correlation of sensors are influenced by
multiple factors, including the deployment of sensors,
the surrounding environment, and the target movement;
(2) the temporal similarity assumption might fail in
several cases. The sensor’s reliability may reduce over
time, e.g., the sensors might be damaged in the harsh
environment, or run out of power.
2.3

Feature retrieving techniques

Feature retrieving techniques detect faulty data by
comparing distinguishing features. Such methods first
exploit several data features like environmental type,
connecting degree, and temporal patterns, and then
construct classifiers to distinguish different types of
faults. Ni et al. developed some common features,
including system features, environment features, and
data features[25] . They combined different features
to define and detect commonly observed faults. Ni
and Pottie deployed sensors to detect the presence
of arsenic in groundwater[26] . A Fault Remediation
System (FRS) is developed for determining faults and
suggesting solutions using rule-based methods and
static thresholds on the water pressure and other domain
specific features. Tang et al. proposed a Pattern Growth
Graph (PGG) based method to detect variations and
filter noise over evolving medical streams[27] . The
feature of wave-pattern is proposed to capture the
major information of medical data evolution and
represent them compactly. The variations are detected
by a wave-pattern matching algorithm and meaningful
data changes are distinguished from noise. Yu et
al. proposed a two-stage approach to find anomalies
in complicated datasets[28] . The algorithm employs
an efficient deterministic space partition to eliminate
obvious normal instances and generates a small set of
anomaly candidates, and then checks each candidate
with density-based multiple criteria to determine the
final results.
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The feature-based approaches usually have better
performances than the other methods, but they are more
domain specific. Such methods require users providing
detailed context information and defining the faulty
records carefully. Scalability and adaptiveness are the
major problems that prevent their application in a wider
range of CPS.

3

Backgroud and Preliminaries

Recent advances in sensor technology have produced
many types of sensors for area-monitoring and intruder
detection purposes. Such sensors can be roughly
classified into two categories: (1) active sensors
(e.g., infrared sensors and radar sensors): These
sensors radiate signal pulses and detect objects by the
echo bouncing off the intruders; (2) passive sensors
(e.g., acoustic sensors, seismic sensors, and magnetic
sensors): These sensors only receive signals from the
environment. Active sensors achieve higher accuracy,
but require significant more power to operate and drain
batteries quickly. Furthermore, when active sensors
radiate signal pulses, they are at high risk of being
detected by the intruders. As a result, the CPS is usually
deployed with a large number of low-cost, energysaving passive sensors.
Though having different mechanisms and
measurements, most passive sensors report the
detected signals as a numeric value. For example, an
acoustic sensor measures the air pressure of sound wave
and a magnetic sensor generates the readings about
magnetic force. Such measurements are influenced by
two factors: (1) the intruder’s energy (i.e., the strength
of emitted signals from the intruder); (2) the distance
between the sensor and the intruder. Usually we can
model the relationship between intruder o and sensor s
as Eq. (1).
e
f .o; s/ D
(1)
˛  d .o; s/ˇ C
where e is o’s energy and d.o; s/ is the Euclidean
distance between them. The parameters ˛, ˇ, and are
determined by the sensor types and mechanisms.
If there are multiple intruders in the monitoring
area, we assume that their signals aggregate at each
sensor. Let O be the intruder set, sensor s’s reading is
estimated as Eq. (2).
X
X
e
r.s/
O
D
f .o; s/ D
(2)
ˇ
o2O
o2O ˛  d .o; s/ C
All real world signals are influenced by noise, hence the
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observed reading of s is
X
r.s/ D r.s/
O C D
f .o; s/ C  D
o2O

e

X
o2O

˛  d .o; s/ˇ C

C

(3)

Without loss of generality, we assume that the
background noise is zero mean Gaussian noise, i.e.,
  N.0;  2 /.
Note that the sensor readings are collected and
transmitted by various gateways, such as the aircraft
bridges in Table 1. There are many state-of-the-art
works on gateway design, sensor deployment, and
message transmission[29, 30] . Since the main theme of
this study is on data mining, we assume that the data can
be collected by CPS (i.e., the sensors have been already
deployed and the command center can receive timeslice
snapshots of the data in real time). Now the task boils
down to find out the intruders’ information from such
data.
Definition 1 (Problem Definition) Let S be the
set of deployed sensors in a CPS, S D fs1 .xs1 ; ys1 /,
s2 .xs2 ; ys2 /, s3 .xs3 ; ys3 /,    , sn .xsn ; ysn /g, and R be
the sensors’ readings in a snapshot, R Dfr.s1 /, r.s2 /,
   , r.sn /g. The task of IntruMine is to estimate the
intruders O Dfo1 .xo1 ; yo1 ; e1 /, o2 .xo2 ; yo2 ; e2 /,    ,
ok .xok ; yok ; ek /g based on S and R.

4

Trustworthiness Analysis of Sensor Data

Although there are a large number of sensors in CPS,
not all of them are relevant to the mining task. Typically,
only a few of them have detected the intruders. The first
step is to select the set of relevant sensors and make
trustworthiness analysis on their data.
If a sensor works well, it should detect all intruder
movements inside the detecting range. Formally, we
define the monitored intruder set.
Definition 2 Let O be the intruder set and ds be the
detecting range of a sensor s. The monitored intruder
Table 1

Experiment settings.

Number of Number of
objects
sensors
Real .D1/
5
213
Syn 1 .D2/
64
400
Syn 2 .D3/
64
2500
Syn 3 .D4/
64
10 000
Dataset

Number of
Faulty (%)
readings
2:1  105
 10
4:3  105
20
2:7  106
30
1:1  107
40

Notes: ır : 0.3 0.9, default 0.7; ıo : 0.2 0.8, default 0.6: ˛ D
10; ˇ D 1; D 1

set of s is defined as Os D fo jo 2 O, dist.s; o/ < ds g.
Similarly, we obtain the monitoring sensor set as
below.
Definition 3 Let S be a sensor set and ds be the
detecting range of a sensor s. The monitoring sensor set
of an intruder o is defined as So = fs j s 2 S , dist(s; o/ <
ds g. If s 2 So generates an alarm record ra (s, t ), then
ra (s, t) is said to be related to o.
One may notice that, an alarm may be related
to multiple intruders and an intruder usually has
several related alarms. In this way, we build up a
relational graph between the intruders and sensors. In
this monitoring graph, two kinds of nodes are presented:
the intruders and their monitoring sensor’s data records.
The sensor-intruder relationship is modeled as an edge
in the graph.
The monitoring graph partitions the CPS dataset and
links the intruders to relevant data records. There are
two kinds of edges in the graph: the normal edge
linking the intruder with a normal record, and the
alarm edge. The weight of an alarm edge represents
the probability that the alarm is caused by such an
intruder. Hence the system has to infer the weights
of alarm edges, i.e., compute the conditional alarm
trustworthiness  .ra .si ; t /jo/.
 .ra .si ; t /jo/ is determined by the coherence of other
sensors’ readings in monitoring sensor set So . If other
sensor’s readings are all coherent with ra .s; t/, its
trustworthiness is high, otherwise it is unlikely to be
caused by o.
X
coh.r.sj ; t /; ra .si ; t//
 .ra .si ; t /jo/ D

sj 2So ;sj ¤si

jSo j

1

(4)
To estimate the coherence score between two
sensors’ records, we should consider both their
reading difference and positions. When computing
coh.ra .si ; t /; r.sj ; t //, the system should consider
whether sj would report the same severity if it was
located at si ’s position.
The equation of computing r(s; t) can be learned
in advance. Then it is easy to deduce the inverse
function of intruder o’s signal strength. For example,
from Eq. (1) we can estimate ˝j .o/ D .r.sj ; t/
b/=˛. The expected severity of sensor sj at si ’s location
is computed as
r 0 .sj ; t / D f .dist.si ; o/; ˝j .o//:
Coherence coh.ra .si ; t /; r.sj ; t // is judged by the
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difference of the expected reading and real reading of
sj , as shown in Eq. (5). Its value range is [0, 1]. If
sensor sj ’s severity is the same as the expected value,
the coherence score reaches the maximum of 1; if the
difference is larger than standard deviation  , i.e., sj ’s
severity is quite different from the expected value, the
coherence score is set to 0.
diff.r 0 ; r/ D jr 0 .sj ; t / r.sj ; t /j;
coh.ra .si ; t/; r.sj ; t // D
8
(5)
diff.r 0 ; r/
<
1
; if diff.r 0 ; r/ <  ;

: 0;
otherwise
A low .ra .s; t /jo/ indicates two possibilities: (1)
ra (s, t ) is a false alarm; or (2) ra (s, t) is a true alarm,
but it is not caused by intruder o. In either case, intruder
o’s trustworthiness should be decreased. Therefore, we
compute intruder o’s trustworthiness as the average of
all its conditional alarm trustworthiness (Eq. (6)).
X
 .ra .s; t /jo/
.o/ D

s2So ;ra 2Ra

(6)
jSo j
The equation to compute alarm trustworthiness is
a bit different. If an alarm has different conditional
trustworthiness with different intruders, the system will
take the maximum one as the result (Eq. (7)). Because
if there is only one meaningful intruder that causes the
alarm, the alarm is still meaningful.
.ra .s; t// D max. .ra .s; t /jo//; o 2 Os

5

(7)

Mining Intruders

After selecting out trustworthy sensor data, we can
proceed to detect the intruders’ appearances in each
snapshot. The sensors near the intruders usually have
higher readings than sensors that are far away. Such
sensors are denoted as the peak reading sensors. They
can be easily obtained by a single scan of the sensors’
readings.
For each peak reading sensor s, the system initializes
an intruder o at s’s position. In some rare cases, several
neighboring sensors may have the same readings. Then
the system randomly picks one of them to initialize
the intruder. It is worth noting that other strategies can
also be used to initialize the intruders, such as sampling
method[16] , random selection[10] , and so on.
Since the initialization of the intruders’ appearances
are derived from the peak reading sensors, the locations
may not be accurate. To overcome this problem, we
propose the method to adjust the attributes of intruders
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iteratively.
In a snapshot, the reading of each sensor, r.s/, is
already known. With the information of intruders, we
can further calculate the estimated reading of s as
X
r.s/
O
D
f .o; s/
(8)
o2g

Then the probability of observing the sensor’s
reading as r.s/ is
2
.r.s/ r.s//
O
1
2 2
p.s/ D p
e
(9)
2 2
The joint probability of observing the readings within
monitoring graph g is
2
Y
.r.s/ r.s//
O
1
2 2
p.S / D
e
D
p
2 2
s2g
jgj P .r.s/ r.s//

2
O
s2g
1
2 2
e
(10)
p
2 2
Hence the log-likelihood of observing the readings of
sensors within monitoring graph g is
log.p.S // /
X
2
.r.s/ r.s//
O
jgj log. 2 /

s2g

(11)
2
Suppose there are k intruders in the monitoring
graph g, the intruder’s attribute vector 
D
f.xo1 ; yo1 ; e1 /; .xo2 ; yo2 ; e2 /;    ; .xok ; yok ; ek /g. Based
on the maximum likelihood criterion, the estimation of
 is equivalent to
X
2
arg max
.r.s/ r.s//
O
D


s2g

arg min


X

.r.s/

2
r.s//
O

(12)

s2g

The difference between the estimated reading
r.s/
O
and the real reading r.s/ represents the error
 of intruder information. In the best case, the
sensor’s readings just fit intruder’s information and the
difference is minimized.
X
2
Let g D
.r.s/ r.s//
O
. We can use a gradient
s2g

descent algorithm to compute the attribute vector 
iteratively. At the first iteration,  is initialized with
the information of peak reading sensors. The value of
the n-th iteration can be calculated from the gradient of
.n 1/-th iteration as follows.
1 @ng 1
n
n 1
(13)
i D i
p
n @in 1
Let Soi be the monitoring sensor set of intruder oi ,
the gradients of g with respect to xoi , yoi , and ei are
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computed as shown in Eqs. (14)-(16).
X 4˛.r.sj / r.s
@g
O j //  ei  .xsj
D
2
@xoi
.˛d .o ; s /ˇ C /
sj 2Soi

@g
D
@yoi

i

X 4˛.r.sj /

@g
D
@ei

r.s
O j //  ei  .ysj

.˛d .oi ; sj / C /
X
sj 2Soi

(14)

2.r.sj /

2

r.s
O j //

˛d .sj ; oi /ˇ C

oi D
yoi /

s2g

s2Soi

(15)
N D

(16)

The estimation algorithm adjusts the intruder’s
attribute values and updates the monitoring
graphs. However, there are still two problems
influencing the mining accuracy: (1) Some monitoring
graphs are created due to faulty readings and may not
contain any real intruders. Hence the false positive
intruders will be generated by such graphs. (2) Some
sensors in the monitoring graph of real intruders are
unreliable, such as s4 in g1 . To solve this problem, the
system needs to verify the estimated results.
From Eq. (5), the derivative of likelihood log.p.S //
with respect to  2 is
X
2
.r.s/ r.s//
O
@ log.p.S//
jgj s2g
D
(17)
2
@
2
. 2 /2
Setting the derivative to zero, we obtain
X
2
.r.s/ r.s//
O
2 D

average difference of all the intruders.
X
2
.r.s/ r.s//
O

j

ˇ

sj 2Soi

xoi /

(18)
jgj
Based on the estimated  2 , we can verify
the reliability of the sensor’s reading. A classic
measurement in statistics is the 3-standard deviation: If
the deviation of estimated reading r.s/
O
with respect to
the true reading r.s/ is not within 3 standard deviations,
2
i.e., .r.s/ r.s//
O
> 9 2 , then we judge that the reading
of such sensor is unreliable.
To filter out false positives, we define the confidence
of intruder detection as follows.
Definition 4 The confidence of detected intruder o
is the probability that o really exists, denoted as  .o/.
Intuitively, the readings of monitoring sensors are
caused by intruders. If the actual readings are similar
to the estimated ones, this suggests a high confidence
that the intruder is real. For a false positive, the
difference between actual and estimated readings will
be large. Therefore, we can estimate the confidence of
a detected intruder from the reading difference of its
monitoring sensor set.
In the verification process, the system first calculates
the reading difference oi for each intruder and the

jS j
X oi
oi

(19)

oi2O

(20)
jOj
Then the intruder detection confidence is estimated
as Eq. (21). For an intruder oi , if the monitoring
sensor’s readings are coherent with the information
(small reading difference), the intruder’s confidence is
N which
high. If the reading difference is larger than ,
indicates that the real readings are quite different from
the estimated ones, the intruder detection confidence is
set as zero.
8
oi
<
N
1
; oi < I
 .oi / D
(21)
N
: 0;
oi > N

6
6.1

Performance Evaluation
Experiment setup

Datasets: We conduct extensive experiments to
evaluate the proposed methods, using both real-world
and synthetic datasets. To test the performance of
IntruMine in large and untrustworthy data collected
from CPS, we generate three synthetic datasets based on
the military trajectories in the CBMANET project[31] ,
in which an infantry battalion of 64 vehicles moves
from Fort Dix to Lakehurst during a mission lasting 3
hours. The data generator simulates monitoring fields
along their routes with 400 to 10 000 deployed sensors,
and each sensor reports a reading every 10 seconds.
Baselines: The proposed algorithm (IM) is compared
with TruAlarm method (TA) in Ref. [16]. We
also implemented the Maximum Likelihood based
estimation (ML) method based on the principles
proposed in Ref. [10]. We evaluated both efficiency and
effectiveness of the algorithms in the experiments.
Environments: The experiments are conducted on
a PC with Intel 7500 Dual CPU 2.20 GHz and
3.00 GB RAM. The operating system is Windows 7
Enterprise. All the algorithms are implemented in Java
on Eclipse 3.3.1 platform with JDK 1.5.0. The datasets
and parameter settings are listed in Table 1.
6.2

Comparisons in mining efficiency

In the first experiment, we evaluate the efficiency of
different algorithms on default settings. The system
processes IM, TA, and ML on the four datasets and
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records their average time cost on each snapshot. Figure
1a shows the results by dataset and Fig. 1b records
the algorithm’s running time w.r.t. the total number of
sensors, N . Note that the y-axes are in logarithmic
scale. IM achieves the best efficiency on all the
datasets. In the largest dataset D4, IM is an order of
magnitude faster than ML and two orders of magnitude
faster than TA.
We also study the factors that influence IM’s
efficiency. We set the reading threshold ır as 0.3 to 0.9
of the typical intruder energy and record the algorithm’s
time cost on datasets D1 to D4 in Fig. 2a. Then we
carry out the same experiments for confidence threshold
ıo (Fig. 2b). The results show that the influence of
ır is larger than ıo , because ıo only influences the
verification step, but ır determines the size of the
monitoring graphs. With higher ır , the system can
generate smaller monitoring graphs and increase the
mining efficiency, especially in the large datasets with
densely deployed sensors (e. g., D4).
6.3

2500

Time (ms)

2000

10 6

IM

TA

ML

Time (ms)

10 5
10 4
10 3
10 2
10

1

10 0

D1

D2
D3
Dataset
(a)

D4

10 6

Time (ms)

10 5
10 4
10 3
10 2
10

IM
TA
ML

1

10 0
400

2500

10 000
N
(b)

Fig. 1 Efficiency: (a) different datasets and (b) sensor
number.

D2
D4

1500
1000
500
0

0.3

0.5
δr

0.7

0.9

(a)
2500

Time (ms)

2000
1500
D1
D3

1000

D2
D4

500
0

Evaluations of detecting effectiveness

To evaluate the quality of mining results, we retrieve
the intruder’s true position and energy in each snapshot

D1
D3

Fig. 2

0.2

0.4

δo
(b)

0.6

0.8

Efficiency: IntruMine on different ı r and ı o .

as the ground truth and compare the mining results with
them. The system first compares the number of detected
intruders with ground truth to calculate the measures of
precision and recall, then matches the detected intruder
to the nearest one in ground truth and computes the
relative errors of energy and position.
Since ML requires the exact number of real intruders
as the input (i.e., with 100% precision and recall),
we only record the precision and recall of IM and
TA in Fig. 3. Both of them can detect all the real
intruders, but IM’s precision is about 20% higher. The
number of false positives reported by IM is only as half
as TA, because IM’s peak sensor based initialization
and intruder verification step could filter out the false
positives effectively.
All three methods can detect the intruders, we further
check their detecting effectiveness by calculating the
relative errors of energy and position. The results are
shown in Fig. 4. ML has the largest errors: The average
energy error is more than 50% and the position error is
about 40% in D3 and D4. The reason of ML’s failure
is that the algorithm takes count in the reading from
all the sensors, and it is inevitably influenced by the
faulty readings and noises. ML’s accuracy degenerates
rapidly on datasets D3 and D4, since there are more
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Fig. 3 Effectiveness: (a) precision and (b) recall on different
datasets.

Fig. 4 Effectiveness: (a) energy error and (b) position error
on different datasets.

faulty readings. This result indicates that ML is not
feasible to process untrustworthy data. The errors of
IM are much lower, with no more than 5% in all the
datasets. The performance of IM even improves on D3
and D4, because with more deployed sensors, IM can
effectively filter the untrustworthy ones and utilize the
information for accurate estimation.

in recent years. It is attractive to integrate
CPS with social network. There are several
novel problems while combing the physical data
with social network, including: (1) indexing,
searching, and querying the CPS data via social
network structure; (2) considering privacy and
security issues when publishing CPS data on
social network; (3) discovering spatial-temporal
patterns from CPS data with social network, e.g.,
mining traveling patterns in a location-based social
network. These studies will definitely enrich the
research on both CPS and social network.
 Mining feature-rich sensor data: The sensor data
are usually collected with rich information features
of the objects, e.g., a traveler’s trajectory can be
collected by the smart phone, with the information
of the users profile, text message, contacts, and so
on. These information not only helps understand
the semantic and purpose of the data records,
but also contributes to improve many mining
functions, such as target prediction, traveler
clustering, route recommendation, and so on.
 Integrating the real-world interdisciplinary
applications: Information management and data

7

Conclusions and Future Work

This paper studies the problem of sensor data mining
in cyber-physical systems. A method called IntruMine
is proposed to detect and verify the intruders from
untrustworthy sensor data. The system constructs the
monitoring graph and estimates the intruder attributes
with the link information. The information of reading
difference is used to filter out the unreliable sensors and
false positives. There are many interesting directions
of future work in the line of cyber-physical data
mining, such as combining CPS with social networks,
developing novel mining functions on feature-rich
movement data, and integrating the technology with
real-world interdisciplinary applications.
 Combining CPS with social network: Social
network analysis has attracted much attention

Lu-An Tang et al.: Mining Sensor Data in Cyber-Physical Systems

mining on CPS represent an important research
frontier in database, data mining, sensor network,
and information technology. This technology
has a wide range of applications across different
domains, such as patient healthcare, battlefield
surveillance, traffic monitoring, and other cases
in science, engineering, education, society, and
any field with massive, dynamic, heterogeneous,
and interrelated physical and virtual data. It is
important to integrate the algorithms with real
applications to improve system performance.
Acknowledgements
The work was supported in part by the U.S. Army
Research Laboratory under Cooperative Agreement
Nos. W911NF-09-2-0053 (NS-CTA) and W911NF-11-20086 (Cyber-Security), the U.S. Army Research Office
under Cooperative Agreement No. W911NF-13-1-0193,
DTRA, and U.S. National Science Foundation grants
CNS-0931975, IIS-1017362, IIS-1320617, and IIS1354329. The views and conclusions contained in this
document are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as representing the official policies, either
expressed or implied, of the Army Research Laboratory or
the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized
to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government
purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation here on.

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

References
[1]

[2]

[3]
[4]

[5]
[6]

[7]

I. Hwang, H. Balakrishnan, K. Roy, and C. Tomlin,
Multiple-target tracking and identity management in
clutter, with application to aircraft tracking, in Proceedings
of the American Control Conference, 2004.
M. Hewish, Reformatting fighter tactics, http://www.
cs.berkeley.edu/  prabal/nest/resources/Hewish2001.pdf,
2001.
L. Tang, X. Yu, Q. Gu, J. Han, A. Leung, and T. La Porta,
Mining lines data in cyber-physical system, in KDD, 2013.
C. Lo, W. Peng, C. Chen, T. Lin, and C. Lin,
Carweb: A traffic data collection platform, in International
Conference on Mobile Data Management, 2008.
Y. Zheng and X. Zhou, Computing with Spatial
Trajectories. Springer, 2011.
X. Li, R. Lu, X. Liang, X. Shen, J. Chen, and X. Lin,
Smart community: An internet of things application, IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 49, no. 11, pp. 68-75,
2011.
G. Tolle, J. Polastre, R. Szewczyk, D. E. Culler, N. Turner,
K. Tu, S. Burgess, T. Dawson, P. Buonadonna, D. Gay,
and W. Hong, A macroscope in the redwoods, in the ACM
Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems,
2005.

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]
[20]

[21]

[22]

233
Z. Li, J. Han, M. Ji, L. Tang, Y. Yu, B. Ding,
J. Lee, and R. Kays, Movemine: Mining moving object
data for discovery of animal movement patterns, ACM
Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology, vol.
2, no. 4, p. 27, 2011.
R. Szewczyk, J. Polastre, A. Mainwaring, and D. Culler,
Lessons from a sensor network expedition, in European
Workshop on Wireless Sensor Networks, 2004.
X. Sheng and Y. Hu, Maximum likelihood multiple source
localization using acoustic energy measurements with
wireless sensor networks, IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing, 2005.
M. A. Hammad, W. G. Aref, and A. K. Elmagarmid,
Stream window join: Tracking moving objects in sensor
network databases, in International Conference on
Scientific and Statistical Database Management, 2003.
J. Aslam, Z. Butler, F. Constantin, V. Crespi, G. Cybenko,
and D. Rus, Tracking a moving object with a binary sensor
network, in the ACM Conference on Embedded Networked
Sensor Systems, 2003.
O. Ozdemir, R. Niu, and P. K. Varshney, Tracking
in wireless sensor network using particle filtering:
Physical layer considerations, IEEE Transactions on
Signal Processing, 2009.
S. J. Pan, J. T. Kwok, Q. Yang, and J. J. Pan, Adaptive
localization in a dynamic wifi environment through multiview learning, in AAAI, 2007.
R. Pan, J. Zhao, V. W. Zheng, J. J. Pan, D. Shen, S. J. Pan,
and Q. Yang, Domain constrained semisupervised mining
of tracking models in sensor networks, in KDD, 2007.
L. Tang, X. Yu, S. Kim, J. Han, C. Hung, and W. Peng,
Trualarm: Trustworthiness analysis of sensor networks in
cyber-physical systems, in ICDM, 2010.
L. Tang, Q. Gu, X. Yu, J. Han, T. La Porta, A. Leung,
T. Abdelzaher, and L. Kaplan, Intrumine: Mining intruders
in untrustworthy data of cyber-physical systems, in Proc. of
SIAM International Conference on Data Mining (SDM),
2012.
A. Deshpande, C. Guestrin, S. Madden, J. M. Hellerstein,
and W. Hong, Model-driven data acquisition in sensor
networks, in VLDB, 2004.
E. Elnahrawy and B. Nath, Cleaning and querying noisy
sensors, in WSNA, 2003.
F. Koushanfar, M. Potkonjak, and A. SangiovanniVincentelli,
On-line fault detection of sensor
measurements, in IEEE Conference on Sensors, 2003.
B. Krishnamachari and S. Iyengar, Distributed bayesian
algorithms for fault-tolerant event region detection in
wireless sensor networks, IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. 53,
no. 3, pp. 241-250, 2004.
S. R. Jeffery, G. Alonso, M. J. Franklin, W. Hong, and
J. Widom, Declarative support for sensor data cleaning, in
ICPC, 2006.

Tsinghua Science and Technology, June 2014, 19(3): 225-234

234
[23] S. Subramaniam, T. Palpanas, D. Papadopoulos,
V. Kalogeraki, and D. Gunopulos, Online outlier
detection in sensor data using non-parametric models, in
VLDB, 2006.
[24] X. Xiao, W. Peng, C. Hung, and W. Lee, Using sensorranks
for in-network detection of faulty readings in wireless
sensor networks, in DEWMA, 2007.
[25] K. Ni, N. Ramanathan, M. N. H. Chehade, L. Balzano,
S. Nair, S. Zahedi, E. Kohler, G. J. Pottie, M. H. Hansen,
and M. B, Srivastava, Sensor network data fault types,
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, 2009.
[26] K. Ni and G. Pottie, Bayesian selection of non-faulty
sensors, in IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory, 2007.
[27] L. Tang, B. Cui, H. Li, G. Miao, D. Yang, and X. Zhou,

Lu-An Tang is a researcher in NEC
Laboratories America. He received
the PhD degree from the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in
2013. His principal research interest is
in data mining, cyber-physical systems,
and computer security. He has over 30
publications in books, journals, and major
conferences.
Jiawei Han received his PhD degree
from University of Wisconsin-Madison in
1985. He is the Abel Bliss Professor of
Computer Science, University of Illinois
at Urbana Champaign. He has been
researching into data mining, information
network analysis, database systems, and
data warehousing, with over 600 journal
and conference publications. He has chaired or served on many
program committees of international conferences, including
PC co-chair for KDD, SDM, and ICDM conferences, and
Americas Coordinator for VLDB conferences. He also served
as the founding Editor-In-Chief of ACM Transactions on
Knowledge Discovery from Data and is serving as the Director
of Information Network Academic Research Center supported
by U.S. Army Research Lab. He is a fellow of ACM and

[28]

[29]

[30]

[31]

Effective variation management for pseudo periodical
streams, in SIGMOD, 2007.
X. Yu, L. Tang, and J. Han, Filtering and refinement:
A two-stage approach for efficient and effective anomaly
detection, in ICDM, 2009.
C. Lin, W. Peng, and Y. Tseng, Efficient in-network
moving object tracking in wireless sensor network, IEEE
Transaction on Mobile Computing, vol. 5, no. 8, pp. 10441056, 2006.
V. Cevher and L. M. Kaplan, Acoustic sensor network
design for position estimation, ACM Transactions on
Sensor Networks, vol. 5, no. 3, 2009.
T. Krout, Cb manet scenario data distribution, in BBN
Technique Report, 2007.

IEEE, and received 2004 ACM SIGKDD Innovations Award,
2005 IEEE Computer Society Technical Achievement Award,
2009 IEEE Computer Society Wallace McDowell Award, and
2011 Daniel C. Drucker Eminent Faculty Award at UIUC. His
book “Data Mining: Concepts and Techniques” has been used
popularly as a textbook worldwide.

Guofei Jiang is the Vice President of
solution technology at NEC Laboratories
America
(NECLA),
assisting
the
transformation of NEC’s research portfolio
toward solutions and services. He received
his PhD degree from Beijing Institute of
Technology in 1998. Concurrently he also
leads a large group with several dozens of
research staffs from the global network of NEC R&D units. His
group conducts fundamental and applied research in the areas
of big data analytics, distributed systems and cloud platforms,
software-defined networking, and computer security. He has
published over 120 technical papers and also has over 50 patents
granted or applied. His inventions have been successfully
commercialized as Award Winning NEC products and solutions,
and have directly created new business lines for NEC with tens
of millions US dollars in revenue.

